NOUMENA

[B307] Opposed by Kant to phenomena in a chapter entitled "the ground of the distinction of all objects in general into phenomena and noumena". On the one hand, "we entitle certain objects, as appearances, sensible entities (phenomena)". On the other hand, "if we thus distinguish the mode in which we intuit them [viz., certain objects which are appearances to us through our conditions of sensibility, and which we can consider abstracted from these conditions] from the nature that belongs to them in themselves, it is implied in this distinction that we place the latter, considered in their own nature, although we do not so intuit them...in opposition to the former, and that in so doing we entitle them intelligible entities (noumena)." This distinction seems to support Allison's "dual aspect" interpretation. Clearly, Kant believes that we can neither intuit nor have any determinate cognitions of the nature of objects in themselves, and that these (due to the transcendental ideality of our forms of intuition) "are not objects of our senses", although in some sense we can think about noumena "merely through the understanding" (although we don't have a concept, or any other ind of representation of them).